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Making Payments on the Internet
James J. McAndrews*
A review of these efforts reveals the importance
of security, authenticity, and privacy, which are
often overlooked or taken for granted in other
instances of making a payment.
Money is an ancient human artifice.  For
approximately 3000 years coins have been
minted in India and Greece. Minting coins for
use as media of exchange was a significant im-
provement over the alternative: exchange of
metals by weight for purchases. Coins made a
particular amount and quality of metal easily
recognizable and hard to counterfeit. Milling
the edges of coins made the practice of remov-
ing small amounts of metal from the coins very
easy to detect. The creation of banks of deposit
and their vaults made safeguarding coins easier.
The Internet has begun to make the ideal-
ized marketplace discussed in economic text-
books seem more plausible. It allows low-cost,
speedy, convenient, and informative commu-
nication across the world. However,  to become
an active market in goods and services the
Internet must overcome a fundamental hurdle:
a way must be devised for buyers and sellers
to securely and conveniently exchange payment
over the Internet. Software companies and fi-
nancial institutions are now developing meth-
ods that will allow people to pay on the Internet.
*James McAndrews is a senior economist and research
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Hence, coins became readily identifiable and
transferable, attributes that raw metals did not
possess. These attributes made trade easier.
Our society is grappling with ways to cre-
ate, once again, a way to make payments in a
new medium: the Internet. The designers of
Internet means of payment have the same con-
cerns that occupied mints centuries ago: how
to make the proposed means of exchange easy
to recognize and authenticate, but hard to coun-
terfeit and steal. Today’s designers work with
powerful mathematical means of encryption,
which can serve the same roles for Internet pay-
ments that minting coins served for earlier pay-
ment systems.
Several attributes of a successful medium of
exchange—one of money’s primary roles—
have emerged over the centuries.  Money
should be identifiable, divisible, easy to trans-
fer (both technologically and in the sense of
there being widespread acceptance), and easy
to protect against theft. The attempts to create
successful media of exchange over the Internet
reveal the importance of these attributes as well
as the difficulties of successfully designing a
system with those attributes.
THE INTERNET
The Internet, a network of computers that
use a common method of communication, has
experienced rapid growth in recent years. While
estimates of Internet size and usage are impre-
cise, one estimate shows that the number of
computers linked to the Internet increased from
213 in August 1981 to 3,864,000 in October 1994
and to 9,472,000 in January 1996. The amount
of message traffic across one part of the Internet
is estimated to have grown from 85 million
packets in January 1988 (a packet is approxi-
mately 200 bytes; a byte holds one alphabetic
character) to more than 60 billion packets in
January 1995.
1  The Internet is used to send mail,
to transfer files, and—using the World Wide
Web—to transmit graphics and sound.
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The impressive growth of the Internet has
been facilitated to some extent by the steadily
declining cost of computers. Furthermore, in
many cases, individual users of the Internet (or
their employers or sponsoring organizations)
pay a fixed fee, or a fee that does not vary with
the number of sites from which they gather in-
formation, and there is no marginal fee for the
use of the network facilities in sending or re-
ceiving information. This zero marginal cost of
usage makes sending a message across the
country essentially free for many users.
The Internet differs from telephone networks
in that each message does not have a circuit
dedicated to it. Instead, a message on the
Internet is divided into packets, each with the
address of the message attached to it, and the
individual packets are sent through computers
(known as routers) to their destinations. This
packet switching method allows many packets
to simultaneously share the physical telecom-
munication lines across which the packets
travel. This greatly economizes on the use, and
therefore the costs, of telephone lines, relative
to telephone calls, which use a circuit switching
method that dedicates a circuit to a particular
call.
3
This inexpensive and increasingly ubiqui-
tous form of communication and information
transmission has made it possible to imagine
continuous, worldwide electronic commerce.
On the Internet, one can comparison-shop, read
1The first of the two estimates was made by network
analyst Mark Lottor, and the second refers to message traf-
fic across the NSFNET backbone—that part of the trans-
mission lines funded by the National Science Foundation.
These estimates are reported by the Merit Network, Inc., a
nonprofit corporation providing a number of Internet ser-
vices.
2The World Wide Web is a communications protocol
developed for graphical content and sound.
3A good discussion of the Internet is given by Jeffrey K.
MacKie-Mason and Hal Varian in “Economic FAQs About
the Internet,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 8,
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warranties, establish accounts, view images of
products, and order goods and services from
companies located anywhere in the world.
Home shopping on the Internet could reduce
the transaction costs of shopping significantly;
many believe that it is the “killer app” of the
Internet.
4 To flourish as a marketplace, however,
the Internet needs a means of payment, but
payment over the Internet faces some unique
barriers. In particular, the challenge is to devise
ways to protect against theft while conveying
payment information that is recognized as au-
thentic.
CAN I PAY WITH A CREDIT CARD
OVER THE INTERNET?
When I make a phone call to my favorite
mail-order catalog to order a pair of shoes, the
only parties to the call are the order taker and
me. If I were to send an e-mail over the Internet
to the catalog company instead, the informa-
tion may be routed through many computers
not party to the transaction before it reaches the
merchant, allowing others to intercept my mes-
sage. If my credit card number is included, oth-
ers can steal it. Furthermore, if a hacker has in-
filtrated either the merchant’s computer net-
work or the one of my Internet access provider,
the hacker could intercept, read, and alter mes-
sages.  Because of that, I can’t be sure that my
messages haven’t been read or altered after I’ve
sent them. The activity of intercepting and read-
ing others’ messages is known as snooping.
While telephone fraud is a big problem, the
ease with which criminals can fake e-mail mes-
sages of others—someone with sufficient
knowledge of computer systems can connect
to the victim’s mailserver on the Internet and
send the fake message from it (an activity
known as spoofing)—makes enhanced security
a necessity. It is also much easier for criminals
to establish untraceable computer accounts to
fraudulently collect credit card numbers (if they
were unencrypted).  It is much more difficult
to do so with telephone mail-order operations.
The real possibility of theft of the informa-
tion has precluded the widespread use of
unencrypted credit card numbers over the
Internet. Furthermore, the ease with which
criminals can adopt fraudulent identities and
untraceable addresses on the Internet deters
people from attempting to purchase items over
the Internet. Therefore, new means of making
payment must be devised.
Designing a method of Internet payments,
therefore, requires attention to two features of
money that are necessary to securely convey
payment information. Authentication of mes-
sages is important for both parties to a transac-
tion.  Finding a means to prevent eavesdrop-
ping is important, so that criminals cannot steal
payment-related information, such as credit
card numbers, as they are transmitted over the
Internet. It may be that secret coding of infor-
mation can solve both of these problems.
ENCRYPTION
As with all types of money, identification and
recognition are necessary before a seller will
accept a payment.  Payment systems today use
various means to identify a payer. In credit card
transactions conducted in person, possession
of the card and a signature matching the one
on its back suffice.  For point-of-sale transac-
tions with a debit card, possession of the card
and a password identify the account holder.
When paying by check, a signature (and often
a photo identification card) is necessary.  For
cash transactions, the currency is examined to
authenticate it.
On the Internet this means that correctly
identifying the customer and maintaining the
integrity of the information are vital.  A pass-
word—even one that has been encoded by some
encryption device—is not enough to identify a
person if it is used more than once (because of
4A killer app is an application of a particular technol-
ogy that many potential users find irresistible.6 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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the possibility of theft of the password). If an
encoded message is used more than once, it
could be duplicated and sent by some other
person posing as the original sender.
None of the measures used to authenticate
the means of payment today are foolproof.
Counterfeit currency and check and credit card
fraud are significant problems. But the ease with
which snoopers can intercept unencrypted
messages has led security experts to believe that
encryption of financial information is necessary
to approach the levels of security that people
now enjoy with cash, checks, and routine credit
card payments.
Privacy.  Securing the integrity of a message
sent on the Internet poses a difficult problem.
Even when a message is encoded, if criminals
were to decode the message, or steal the “key”
by which the original message was encoded,
the integrity of the message would be lost. With
traditional encryption methods the sender and
receiver have to share the key to successfully
encrypt and decrypt a message.  Therefore, the
sender has to give the key to the receiver in
some way. This makes the management of the
secret key extremely difficult because it is much
more likely to be stolen as it is shared with many
parties (for example, all the merchants that ac-
cept a type of credit card) and as it is being com-
municated to all the parties to a message. Fur-
thermore, with traditional methods of encryp-
tion, once someone has stolen the key, messages
can be both decoded and encoded. Hence, a
criminal, armed with the key, can pose as a le-
gitimate party to the encryption system, and
no one could detect the deception.
A new type of encryption was discovered in
the 1970s by Whitfield Diffie and Martin
Hellman, two American mathematicians. Their
contribution to encryption theory was to rec-
ognize that systems of encryption can be cre-
ated that use a pair of keys, one to encrypt the
message and another to decrypt it. One type of
these “asymmetric” cipher systems is a “public
key/private key”cipher  (commonly referred to
simply as a public key cipher) in which the en-
crypting key need not be kept secret to ensure
a private message.
5  The decrypting key (the
“private key”) need never be shared with any-
one else and, therefore, is much less susceptible
to theft.  (See Keys to Establishing Trust in
Cyberspace.)
Under public key cryptography, if two
people wish to exchange private messages, they
each create a pair of public and private keys.
Alice obtains Bob’s public encryption key, uses
it to encrypt a message to Bob, and sends it to
him. Bob can then decrypt it using his private
key. Only someone who has Bob’s private key
can decrypt messages encoded with his public
key. To reply, Bob obtains Alice’s public key,
encrypts a message, and sends it to Alice. She
deciphers the message using her private key.
This system of encryption offers a great deal of
security in managing the private keys because
they never have to be shared with anyone.
Clever applications of this type of cryptogra-
phy can be used to verify identity (using a “digi-
tal signature”), authenticate messages, and pro-
vide a record of when a transaction occurred—
all vital aspects of a trustworthy means of pay-
ment on the Internet.
Encryption of electronic financial informa-
tion traveling across the Internet offers a safe-
guard against theft of information, and the digi-
tal signature offers a way to authenticate the
message. Hence, these sophisticated math-
ematical devices play the roles that other de-
vices that prevent the theft of money—such as
vaults, wallets, and commonsense security pre-
cautions—and devices that authenticate
money—such as watermarks, specially printed
paper, passwords, telephone authorization, and
signatures—play in other forms of money.
5A good discussion of public key cryptography is con-
tained in Bruce Schneier’s book Applied Cryptography, John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., second edition, 1996.Making Payments on the Internet James J. McAndrews
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APPROACHES TO INTERNET PAYMENTS
There are currently several approaches to
offering payment services on the Internet:
credit-card-based systems (which represent an
extension of credit by the issuer of the credit
card to the holder); payment orders (much like
a check is an order to one’s bank to make pay-
ment); or a new form of payment, digital cash.
6
Most use some form of the public key/private
key encryption system, but others safeguard
financial information in other ways.
Trusted Third Party.  At least one firm offers
a trusted-third-party method of payment: a
customer authorizes the trusted third party to
make payments on her behalf.  In such a sys-
tem the customer supplies (over the phone or
through the mail) the trusted third party with
her credit card number or a voided check and
written authorization to effect payment on her
behalf. The customer is supplied with a pass-
word.  As the customer orders a product over
the Internet, she supplies the seller with her
password; the seller reports this to the trusted
third party; and it, in turn, sends to the customer
a report of the transaction and asks the customer
to confirm it. Once confirmed, the trusted third
party conveys the payment information
through the automated clearing house system
(the electronic interbank system that banks use
to exchange small-value payments). This sys-
tem avoids the problem of eavesdropping,
which is a concern in transmitting payment in-
formation across the Internet.
The trusted-third-party method offers the
benefit of securing credit card or checking ac-
count information against theft. It requires,
however, sellers as well as buyers to accept pay-
ment by the trusted third party; therefore, wide-
spread acceptability is a potentially difficult
hurdle for the system.  As in all the systems we
discuss, the security of the system itself is vital.
Such security requires electronic firewalls that
cannot be breached by a hacker.
Digital Cash.  At least one firm is offering
customers the ability to make payments in
“electronic,” or digital, cash, and others plan to
do so.
7  Digital cash consists of messages that
use a sophisticated set of variants on the public
key/private key encryption system. It is stored
on a computer’s hard disk and is electronically
transferred to a payee. It may also be electroni-
cally replenished by transfer from one’s account
at a participating bank. A digital cash system
employs software held by the participating fi-
nancial institutions, their customers, and mer-
chants. Using that software, the customer cre-
ates digital messages that are authenticated by
the issuing institution in a way that third par-
ties can recognize. The issuer’s authenticated
message is returned to the customer and acts
as a substitute for cash. A merchant that receives
the digital cash can send it on to its bank and
have its account credited or it can spend the
digital cash.
Digital cash systems typically propose to
prevent counterfeiting by virtue of the issuer’s
digital signature on the digital cash, which veri-
fies its authenticity.  Issuers intend to prevent
double spending of the cash by “reissuing” or
replacing digital cash each time it is spent; par-
ticipating financial institutions will not accept
cash with serial numbers that indicate it has
already been spent.
Digital cash has the potential for a feature
many believe is increasingly important in an
electronic information age: anonymity. In prin-
ciple, the merchant need not know who is
spending the digital cash it receives: the cash is
6An extensive list of such approaches is maintained by
Michael Pierce on the Internet; the address is http://
ganges.cs.tcd.ie/mepierce/Project/oninterest.html. There
are links at this site to many firms offering some of the
services described in this article; those sites typically pro-
vide descriptions of the services and plans of the firms.
7See “Banks Get the Green Light to Hit the Internet,”
Bank Network News, July 12, 1995.8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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Cryptography is the science of hiding
the contents of messages from eaves-
droppers by means of “secret writing.”
It has been explored and developed
spectacularly in the last quarter of a cen-
tury—a happy coincidence given the se-
curity needs of the world’s ever-ex-
panding communication networks.
Cryptography can assist in providing the necessary identifiability and pro-
tection against theft that a digital or electronic means of exchange requires.
But, first, some definitions are needed.
Cipher. A cipher is a mathematical function used for encrypting (or cod-
ing) and decrypting (or decoding) a message. One example is the Caesar
cipher, in which each letter in a message is replaced by the third letter fol-
lowing it in the alphabet: a is replaced by d, b by e, and so on, with x re-
placed by a, y by b, and z by c. Modern ciphers use a key, which can take on
many values (and are usually very large numbers). The value of the key
affects the cipher; for example, the Caesar cipher is a simple substitution of
one letter of the alphabet for another, with a key value of 3.  If we change
the key value to 5, then a is replaced by f, b by g, and so on.
Key.  There are two types of key-based ciphers: secret key ciphers, in
which the same key is used for encryption and decryption, and public key
ciphers, in which a pair of keys is created, one for encryption and one for
decryption. In a secret key system, a group that wishes to exchange mes-
sages must share the key to communicate but keep it secret from third par-
ties. Secret key, or symmetric, cryptography is most useful for long mes-
sages. In a public key system, one of the keys (typically the one used for
encryption) can be made public, but the private key (typically the one used
for decryption) need not be shared with anyone else. Furthermore, if the
keys are chosen well, it is practically impossible to determine the private
key even with knowledge of the public key.*   Public key systems make key
management, which refers to the way keys are created, stored, and main-
tained, much simpler and less susceptible to attack.
Public key systems have many useful features that can aid in authenti-
cating a message, uniquely identifying a person, confirming receipt of a
message, and enhancing the privacy of the message. They have the draw-
back of being costly in terms of computing time and effort, relative to secret
key systems, for encrypting and decrypting large amounts of text.
Authenticating a Message. A public key system can assist in authenti-
cating a message by incorporating a “digital signature” in the message. A
digital signature is a clever double use of a pair of public key ciphers. Alice,
in sending a message to Bob, appends her signature to the message, and
she encrypts her signature by means of her private key (usually used for
decrypting a message).  She then uses Bob’s public key to encrypt this “sig-
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message and, seeing a potential signature of Alice, uses her public key to decrypt it. Upon successful
decryption, Bob realizes that only Alice could have sent the message because only she has the private key
counterpart to her public key.  Hence, the digital signature has authenticated the message Alice sent to Bob.
Identifying a Person.  But how does Bob know that Alice is in possession of her private key? It’s possible
that an impostor, claiming to be Alice, sent out the public key in Alice’s name simply to intercept messages
intended for Alice. How then to verify that the person who claims a public key in Alice’s name is Alice?  A
“digital certificate” can serve to verify the identity of the person holding a particular key because it contains
that person’s name and public key, a digital signature, the name of a trusted certificate authority, a serial
number, and a set of dates for which the certificate is valid. The certifi-
cate authority thereby verifies that the public key in the certificate
belongs to the person whose name is attached to it. The process of
obtaining a certificate for one’s public key requires a high degree of
trust and may involve visiting the authority in person and showing
proof of identity.
Confirming a Message. Alice can cheat in this system. First, she
purchases an item using her credit card and a digital signature and
certificate. After she receives the item, she publishes her private key.
She then reports that her private key has been compromised, and she
did not authorize the purchase. One way to lessen the possibility of
this type of cheating is for the receiver, Bob, to have the message time-
stamped by an authority upon receipt. The time-stamp would be simi-
lar to the digital signature of the time-stamping authority and cannot
be altered.  Alice would have had to declare her private key compro-
mised before the purchase, making it possible for the certificate au-
thority to repudiate its certificate for Alice before Bob receives the
message. Diagram 1 shows a digital certificate with a time-stamped
message.
Enhancing Privacy. Using public key cryptography for sending a
long message would be costly in terms of computing time; therefore,
secret key, or symmetric, cipher is preferred. The difficulty lies in how
to communicate the secret key, which cannot be revealed publicly with-
out compromising the encryption. Public key cryptography can solve
the problem by encrypting the secret key using the public key. Then
the secret key would be hidden from everyone except the holder of
the associated private key. This encryption of the secret key is called a
digital envelope (Diagram 2). Digital envelopes are useful when send-
ing a long message. Most payment messages would not be long enough
to require the use of secret key cryptography. The public key cipher














Secret Key Used for
Encrypting and Decrypting
a Message, Encrypted
with Alice’s Public Key
Message Encrypted
with Secret Key
* Decrypting a message in a secret key system requires finding the inverse of the key; for example, in the Caesar cipher
one substitutes a letter three places to the left of the encrypted letter to decrypt a message. Finding the inverse of a public
key is practically impossible for large keys because it would require extraordinarily large amounts of computing.10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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authenticated by the bank, not the customer.
The merchant might sell an item and be directed
to send it to a computer account (if it is a piece
of information that can be sent over computer
networks) or to a post office box, not knowing
who requested it. If the merchant is paid in digi-
tal cash and does not know the identity of the
holder of the computer account, there is no way
the merchant can find out the identity of the
buyer.
8
The concern for privacy is increased today
because of the greater ease of compiling infor-
mation electronically. Many firms sell informa-
tion on their customers to other organizations
for marketing purposes. The enhanced privacy
that is possible in a digital cash system comes
at a cost of more complex software to run the
system.
Credit Card Methods. Visa International and
MasterCard announced on February 1, 1996,
that they have agreed to jointly develop a stan-
dard to solve the problems of snooping and
spoofing.  American Express later joined the
effort as well. The standard is called secure elec-
tronic transactions (SET), and it is based on
public key cryptography. The developers of the
standard will attempt to ensure the integrity of
credit card numbers that a cardholder sends to
a merchant by encrypting the numbers.  Prior
to any transaction, however, the developers of
SET propose to verify the identity of both mer-
chant and cardholder by having either the bank
that issues the card (in the case of the
cardholder) or the merchant’s bank that pro-
cesses the transaction (in the case of the mer-
chant) provide both parties with “digital cer-
tificates.” These certificates may bear the digi-
tal signature of Visa or MasterCard or some
certifying authority (see Keys to Establishing
Trust in Cyberspace). Verifying that the digital
certificate does indeed bear the digital signa-
ture of the expected certifying authority should
help to assure the cardholder that the merchant
has a legitimate relationship with a bank and is
therefore not attempting to fraudulently collect
credit card information for later criminal use.
Furthermore, the proposed design for SET seeks
to ensure that the merchant will not be able to
decrypt the holder’s card number; rather au-
thorization from the merchant’s bank will en-
sure payment, and the consumer’s number will
remain unreadable to the merchant.
Prior to their February announcement, Visa
and MasterCard had embarked on creating
separate standards for securing credit card
transactions on the Internet.  The subsequent
decision to join forces to create and adopt a
single standard will simplify the process of us-
ing the software that will operate the standard.
With a single standard a merchant will be able
to identify itself and secure its payment infor-
mation using only one system. The decision to
jointly develop the system avoided a potentially
costly duplication of effort on the part of the
card associations, banks, and merchants.
Internet Banking.  At least one bank exists
primarily for banking on the Internet: it has only
a small physical office, but a “virtual branch”
on the Internet. While this bank does not offer
a direct method of payment on the Internet, it
allows its customers to pay bills by writing
checks or making an  electronic payment
through the automated clearing house. This
method is a variant of  trusted-third-party pay-
ments because information flows through pri-
vate interbank networks.
Other banks and technology companies have
created the Financial Services Technology Con-
sortium. This group is sponsoring research into
electronic commerce over open networks, such
as the Internet. One of their ventures is the elec-
tronic check project, an attempt to create a pay-
8If the merchant were to find that the cash had previ-
ously been spent, it would seem to have no recourse, given
the cloak of buyer anonymity.  However, David Chaum,
an expert in cryptography, ingeniously devised a system
in which the buyer’s identity is revealed only if the buyer
attempts to spend the cash twice.Making Payments on the Internet James J. McAndrews
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ment method that will be accepted much as a
paper check is today. It, too, proposes to rely
on encryption to secure account numbers and
digital signatures to verify identities, but it will
provide access to one’s bank account, rather
than create digital cash.
ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW MEANS
OF PAYMENT
There are many approaches to payment over
the Internet. Will they all survive? It is too early
to determine whether the different means of
payment are useful and cost-effective, but as in
non-Internet-based payments, it may be that
different forms of payment may survive for dif-
ferent uses and for different users.
Many competing and complementary means
of payment exist today.  For example, while
credit cards are useful for international and
many retail and mail-order transactions, only
some merchants are able to accept credit cards
(that is, they are “signed-up” customers of
banks’ credit card services).  Nor do all consum-
ers have sufficiently high credit ratings to ob-
tain a credit card. Credit card payments are rela-
tively costly to make because they involve an
extension of credit by the issuing bank. Further-
more, credit cards typically are not useful for
paying a friend. Checks, while convenient for
payments to individuals, are not as useful for
international transactions. Checks are also fairly
costly because of the care that must be taken in
routing the paper check through the banking
system and back to the one who wrote the
check. Cash is convenient for low-value pur-
chases and can be used anonymously in some
circumstances, but it is costly to hold in inven-
tory.
Many foresee demand for a way to make
very low-value payments over the Internet. For
example, a person may wish to purchase a pho-
tograph of a movie star for $0.50.  For such small
payments it is costly to write a check or to use a
credit card (which usually requires a minimum
payment of about $20 because of relatively high
cost per use). Typically, one uses cash for such
a small payment.  Hence, digital cash, if it
proves sufficiently convenient and low cost,
would be much in demand for low-value pay-
ments. The cost of a digital cash system is not
yet known. Until such a system is operating on
a fairly large scale, it is not certain that it can be
operated at a sufficiently low cost to make pay-
ments for, say, less than a dollar economical.
Credit card methods may prove useful for
larger dollar amounts on the Internet. People
may be discouraged from using digital cash for
large-value payments because they enjoy less
float when using digital cash—a debit method
of payment—than when using a credit card.
Furthermore, many credit-card holders already
use their cards to make payments by phone and
may therefore be more willing to make the leap
to using them over the Internet.
Privacy and security concerns may induce
some people to use the trusted-third-party
method of payment as well as digital cash.  Both
of these methods avoid sending credit card in-
formation over the Internet, even in a highly
secure encryption scheme. In addition, a con-
sumer may wish to withhold his identity from
a merchant to avoid having the information
used either for marketing purposes or by law
enforcement agencies if he is engaging in ille-
gal activities.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The ways that payments are made in the
United States today are governed and sup-
ported by law and public policy.  For example,
the laws, policies, and contracts that govern the
rights of the various parties involved in a check
transaction are well established. These policies
help to make checks a reliable and predictable
method for making a payment for all the par-
ties involved in the checking system.
For the proposed Internet payment systems,
issues such as consumer protection, disclosure
and assignment of participant liability, and pri-
vacy are being addressed by regulators and law-12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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makers. The resolution of these policy issues
will affect the development and acceptance of
the proposed systems.
In particular, questions about the degree to
which disclosure requirements, account state-
ments, and some form of electronic receipt
would be useful and appropriate for Internet
payment systems remain largely unanswered.
Required disclosure of liability can help inform
parties to a system about their responsibilities
and thereby improve decision-making, al-
though such disclosures impose an administra-
tive cost on the system’s operator, which, if the
system is to succeed, will be collected in some
way from the consumers of the service. Account
statements and electronic receipts would assist
users of payment systems in reconstructing
their activities in case there were questions
about unauthorized use of their accounts or
unauthorized payments—again, at a cost of
record-keeping for the system and its users.
Resolution of these issues will clarify the obli-
gations of the parties and, with a careful bal-
ancing of the costs and benefits involved, will
advance the development of acceptable forms
of payment systems on the Internet.
Recently, for example, the Federal Reserve
suggested modifying some provisions of its
Regulation E, which governs many (conven-
tional) electronic methods of payment, as it
applies to stored-value cards.
9  The Board’s pro-
posal suggested that cards that can store no
more than $100 be exempted from the provi-
sions of the regulation, and it makes further
exceptions for various specific types of cards.
For example, under the proposal, a merchant
would not be required to issue paper receipts
when certain types of stored-value cards are
used for payment.  Furthermore, in the proposal
the Board also recognized that stored-value
9See the proposed rule of the Federal Reserve System,
12 CFR Part 205, Regulation E; Docket No. R-0919, April 3,
1996.
systems (such as various digital cash systems)
are being developed for the Internet: “Systems
are being proposed, for example, for making
payments over computer networks, such as the
Internet”; it also requested comments on the
extent to which the Board should consider ap-
plying Regulation E to “various types of net-
work payment products.”
Another legal and contract issue is that, on
the Internet today, the merchant (and the sys-
tem operator and the consumer, for that mat-
ter) has no standardized or generally accepted
and enforceable way to verify the signature or
password of the other party to the transaction.
As a result, the liabilities of the parties are un-
clear in the event of a repudiation of a transac-
tion by a customer when the transaction was
authorized using the customer’s digital signa-
ture. In contrast, the assignment of  liability in
a credit card or (off-line) debit-card transaction
is well established. The credit card associations
were instrumental in standardizing the form of
the contracts used today in the credit card in-
dustry. If Internet payment systems not based
on credit cards are to succeed, such an associa-
tion may be helpful in organizing contracts and
standards that would form the basis for wide-
spread merchant and bank acceptance of the
systems.
 A widespread acceptance of contractual
standards that make the digital signature of the
customer binding may be desirable to address
the issue of how liability is to be assigned in
the case of a repudiated payment.
10 This issue
is complicated by the fact that the federal gov-
10Such a repudiation may be done fraudulently; that is,
a consumer may make a purchase using a payment system
based on digital signatures and then later fraudulently
claim not to have made the purchase. Hence, the effort to
make it difficult to repudiate one’s digital signature will
reduce fraud of this sort. (Alternatively, the consumer may
have mismanaged his or her private key, thereby allowing
someone else to make a purchase using his or her digital
signature, and repudiated the transaction for that reason.)Making Payments on the Internet James J. McAndrews
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ernment has chosen a standard for digital sig-
natures that is different from the standard that
has emerged in private industry.  Neither has
the force of law behind it. Recently, two states,
Utah and California, have passed laws giving
digital signatures the same validity as hand-
written signatures. Similar legislation is pend-
ing in other states.  These laws should reduce
the possibility for repudiation and thereby ad-
vance the development of systems using digi-
tal signatures.
A second issue regarding digital signatures
is who should be allowed to be a certifying au-
thority for the public key used to create such
signatures (see Keys to Establishing Trust in
Cyberspace for a description of the role of a cer-
tifying authority for public keys). The certify-
ing authority, in granting a certificate to a party,
puts its stamp of approval on the certificate
holder’s management of the private key and
provides the certificate holder a proof of iden-
tity. Such certification may carry an implicit
guarantee of performance and hence may re-
quire the certifying authority to bear a consid-
erable amount of risk. The authority may there-
fore require considerable oversight power for
those to whom it grants a certificate.
Digital cash also entails policy consider-
ations. The creators of digital cash envision in-
dividuals transferring it among themselves
with no intermediary, which raises the issue of
what kind of backing digital cash must have.
For instance, must digital cash be backed by
currency 100 percent? This would involve an
issuer’s holding $1 in currency in its vaults for
every $1 of digital cash created.  Alternatively,
should the issuer buy short-term securities,
such as U.S. Treasury bills, as backing for the
digital cash? Under this system, the creation of
digital cash could represent an increase in the
money supply. Beyond this issue lies the possi-
bility for “designer digital cash,” which could
be backed by gold or issued in foreign curren-
cies or which could earn interest. There are few
technological limitations on the backing and
characteristics of digital cash.
Should digital cash be covered by deposit
insurance? This question needs to be settled in
part to determine who is liable in the event of
the failure of an issuer of digital cash. The Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) re-
cently issued a notice and request for public
comment addressing stored-value cards and
other electronic payment systems and their eli-
gibility for deposit insurance.
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The proposed Internet payment systems re-
quire areas of expertise new to most banks.
Such expertise is typically found in software
companies. Banks and bank holding companies
are allowed to engage only in activities that are
“closely related” to banking. It is clear from our
discussion that encryption systems, among
other things, are vital to the success of Internet
payment systems. But is developing an encryp-
tion system an activity “closely related” to
banking? By approving the acquisition of a
home-banking software company by a group
of U.S. and Canadian banks, and by approving
the acquisition of an Internet banking software
company by a subsidiary of a bank holding
company, the Federal Reserve System and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have
shown a willingness to allow banks to provide
services in this area.
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Encryption systems raise issues that go be-
yond banking. There is a tension between the
security of financial messages traveling the
Internet (by means of strong encryption sys-
tems) and the security of the nation and the
ability of its law enforcement authorities to pre-
vent illegal financial transactions. The United
States closely regulates the use of strong levels
11See the notice of the FDIC in the Federal Register, Au-
gust 2, 1996, pp. 40494-97.
12See the orders of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, April
1996, pp. 363-65, and in the issue of July 1996, pp. 674-76.14 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
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of encryption because of its important role in
national security. Some commentators fear that
denial of licenses to export software that in-
cludes strong levels of encryption may put U.S.
firms at a competitive disadvantage. At least
one firm, though, has won approval to export
software based on strong levels of encryption;
its software was for financial use only, and it
was felt that the encryption system could not
be removed from the software.
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The need for confidentiality of payment in-
formation on the Internet is great because of the
greater ease of compiling histories of consum-
ers’ purchases. Enhancements to consumer pri-
vacy laws may be needed to preclude the mis-
use of consumer information by nonfinancial
firms that may offer payment services or affili-
ated software. The question of how much con-
fidentiality is needed in Internet commerce has
spawned a debate about the merits of a com-
pletely anonymous payment system versus the
merits of lower cost, more conventional systems
of credit card and electronic checks that allow
merchants, banks, and system operators to
maintain data bases of user information.
CONCLUSION
Efforts to create a form of Internet money are
attempts to put old wine in new bottles. Money
must be easily identifiable, easy to protect from
theft, widely acceptable, and easy to transfer.
Providers of Internet payment systems are at-
tempting to meet these requirements in vari-
ous ways.  Sophisticated methods of encrypt-
ing the financial information used in payments
may prove to be the modern equivalent of
vaults, signatures, and watermarks. Public
policy will play a role in securing the legal foun-
dations that can help pave the way to widely
acceptable and secure ways to pay on the
Internet.
13“Cybercash Gets Clearance to Sell Product Abroad,”
Wall Street Journal, May 8, 1995.